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5th Circuit Panel Affirms Dismissal of Title VII and ADA Claims
by Transgender Plaintiff for Lack of Comparator Evidence
By Arthur S. Leonard
A panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the 5th Circuit ruled on May 12 that
U.S. District Judge David Hittner (S.D.
Texas) had correctly granted a motion
by the defendant employer, to dismiss
discrimination claims under Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the
Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA)
brought by Elijah Anthony Olivarez, a
transgender man, in connection with
his discharge on April 27, 2018. On
May 14, the court withdrew its opinion
and substituted a new one reaching
the same conclusion but correcting
errors in the first opinion concerning
the applicable Supreme Court standard
for deciding dismissal motions in
employment discrimination cases.
Writing for the panel, Circuit Judge
James Ho asserted that Olivarez failed
to state a discrimination claim under
either statute because he had not alleged
that any similarly situated employee (a
“comparator”) had received any more
favorable treatment than Olivarez.
Olivarez began working as a
retail store associate for T-Mobile in
December 2015. He alleges that during
the first half of 2016, a supervisor
made “demeaning and inappropriate
comments” about his transgender status,
about which he complained to Human
Resources. He alleges that T-Mobile
retaliated against him for filing the
complaint by reducing his hours to
part-time from September 2016 to
November 2016. Anticipating surgical
gender confirmation, Olivarez “stopped
coming to work” in September 2017
“in order to undergo egg preservation
and a hysterectomy,” and the following
month he “applied retroactively”
to Broadspire Services, with which
T-Mobile contracted for administration
of its leave programs, for medical leave
to extend to December 2017. A mixture
of unpaid and paid leave was granted
through December 31, and extended
at Olivarez’s request to February 18,
2018, but a further extension of leave
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was denied in March 2018 and Olivarez
was discharged on April 27, 2018. He
filed charges with the EEOC, received
a right-to-sue letter on August 15, 2019,
and filed suit against T-Mobile and
Broadspire on November 12, 2019.
At the time Olivarez filed suit,
gender identity discrimination claims
under Title VII were not recognized as
such by the 5th Circuit – indeed, Judge
Ho authored a relevant decision to that
effect – and artful pleading would be
necessary to state a claim suing sex
stereotyping or gender non-conformity
theories. Transgender law specialist
Jillian T. Weiss is Olivarez’s counsel
in the 5th Circuit, but the opinion
does not note whether his original
Complaint was file pro se; in any event,
a First Amended Complaint was filed
on November 22, 2019. Judge Hittner
entered a scheduling order on February
13, 2020, setting a deadline of March
13 for any further amendment of
pleadings. At the time, of course, the
Bostock case had been argued but was
not yet decided (and ultimately would
not be decided until June 15, 2020).
Defendants moved to dismiss for
failure to state a claim. Their motion
was denied without prejudice on March
27, 2020, and Judge Hittner permitted
Olivarez to file another amended
complaint, which he did on April
16, followed by defendants’ renewed
motion to dismiss on April 30, which
was granted by Judge Hittner. At the
time the dismissal motion was granted,
the Supreme Court had not announced
its decision in Bostock. After the
Bostock ruling was announced,
Olivarez moved to file a new amended
complaint, but the court denied his
motion.
Of course, Bostock took away one
of the defendants’ key arguments, and
a point of contention on the appeal was
whether the facts as alleged by Olivarez
in his last amended complaint were
sufficient to state a claim under Title

VII (and the ADA) in light of Bostock.
The 5th Circuit panel decided they
were not. Olivarez was not appealing
the district court’s dismissal of his
retaliation claim, which had been found
to be time-barred.
In his original opinion, Judge
Ho focused on McDonnell Douglas
Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973),
as setting the standard for pleading a
disparate treatment claim under Title
VII in the absence of direct evidence of
discriminatory intent. In the substituted
opinion, he acknowledged that the
pleading standard is now governed
by Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534
U.S. 506 (2002). It is not necessary
for the plaintiff to meet the standard
of alleging a prima facie case, as
described in McDonnell Douglas, but
rather to allege facts sufficient to state
claim. However, Judge Ho wrote, the
McDonnell Douglas pleading standards
(which go to the question of a prima
facie case sufficient to shift a burden
of production to the defendant) remain
relevant, pursuant to the 5th Circuit’s
decision in Chhim v. Univ. of Texas
at Austin, 836 F.3d 467 (5th Cir. 2016),
where the court said that the plaintiff
must “plead sufficient facts on all of
the ultimate elements of a disparate
treatment claim to make his case
plausible.” And, according to Judge Ho,
Olivarez “has failed to plead any facts
indicating less favorable treatment than
others ‘similarly situated’ outside of the
asserted protected class.”
Judge Ho asserted that this
pleading requirement was not altered
by Bostock. “Olivarez contends that,
after the district court granted the
motions to dismiss, Bostock changed
the law and created a lower standard
for those alleging discrimination
based on gender identity. T-Mobile and
Broadspire argue that Bostock did no
such thing. We agree with T-Mobile
and Broadspire. Bostock defined
sex discrimination to encompass

sexual orientation and gender identity
discrimination. But it did not alter
the meaning of discrimination itself.”
And, he concluded, “[at] the summary
judgment stage, when the claim relies
on circumstantial evidence, a Title VII
plaintiff must identify a more favorably
treated comparator in order to establish
discrimination. Bostock does not alter
either of those standards.”
Actually, the assertion that failure
to allege a more favorably treated
comparator is necessarily fatal
to a disparate treatment claim is
controversial, a point that Ho appears
to acknowledge in passing earlier in
the opinion when he writes, “And
comparator allegations aside, the
complaint presents no other facts
sufficient to ‘nudge the claims across
the line from conceivable to plausible.’”
This seems to recognize that evidence
other than comparator evidence might
satisfy the pleading requirement at
the motion to dismiss stage in order
to state a plausible discrimination
claim. In this case, Olivarez’s previous
experience with the supervisor who
made “demeaning and inappropriate
comments” about his gender identity
and the subsequent alleged retaliation
against him when he complained to
Human Resources might be cited to
support a claim of discriminatory
motivation, but the court doesn’t
mention that, probably due to the
lack of temporal proximity of those
incidents to the discharge. Also, there is
no mention in the opinion whether the
supervisor who allegedly made those
remarks had anything to do with the
discharge decision.
Judge Ho insists that Bostock
actually requires comparator evidence,
focusing on Justice Neil Gorsuch’s
reasoning for finding that gender
identity claims are covered under Title
VII, which was based on hypothetical
fact patterns involving comparators.
As to the ADA claim, the court found
that Olivarez’s complaint fell short by
failing to allege facts that would support
an inference that he was fired because
of a disability. (There is disagreement
among the federal courts about whether
gender dysphoria is a disability within

the meaning of the ADA, because of
the Helms Amendment that added a
provision stating that “homosexuality”
and
“transsexualism”
are
not
disabilities for purposes of the statute.
Some courts have opined that gender
dysphoria, which is a condition distinct
from “transsexualism,” is not excluded
from coverage by this language.) “At
most,” wrote Judge Ho, “Olivarez made
a conclusory allegation that T-Mobile
and Broadspire ‘discriminated against
[Olivarez] based on [a] disability.’ But
the Rule 8 pleading standard demands
more than conclusory statements.”
The court rejected Olivarez’s
argument that Judge Hittner should have
allowed the filing of a new amended
complaint after the Bostock decision
was announced, but as the court
rejected the argument that Bostock
had changed the pleading standard to
dispense with the necessity to allege
comparator facts, it found that “there
is no intervening change of law that
warrants reconsideration” of the trial
court’s decision to dismiss the case. The
judge also pointed out that Olivarez had
several chances to amend his complaint
if he could come up with comparator
evidence, but he never did so.
Judge Ho’s view of the case can be
summed up by his brief characterization
of it in the introduction of his
opinion: “An employer discharged a
sales employee who happens to be
transgender – but who took six months
of leave, and then sought further
leave for the indefinite future. That is
not discrimination – that is ordinary
business practice.”
Olivarez’s next step could be a
petition for rehearing en banc, but
the odds against succeeding in the 5th
Circuit are fairly long, as twelve of the
seventeen active judges were appointed
by Republican presidents, including
two venerable folks appointed by
Ronald Reagan in the 1980s who have
not taken senior status despite their
age. Donald Trump appointed six of the
active judges. ■
Arthur S. Leonard is the Robert F.
Wagner Prof. of Labor and Employment
Law at New York Law School.

Fourth Circuit
Rules Prisoners
Have No Privacy
Interest in Their
HIV Information
By William J. Rold
Inmate Christopher N. Payne was
in a medical dorm in a Virginia prison
farm when the attending physician
remarked that he had not been taking
his HIV medication, within the hearing
of other inmates, staff, and civilians –
thereby revealing Payne’s HIV status
to others. Payne’s claim for violation of
privacy was dismissed by Senior U.S.
District Judge Liam O’Grady (E.D.
Va.) prior to service, on the ground
that neither the Supreme Court nor the
Fourth Circuit recognized a right to
privacy in inmate medical information.
Payne appealed pro se.
The Fourth Circuit assigned counsel,
and it requested adversary briefing
from defendants. The case was argued,
and the decision took nine months.
While the court pretends otherwise,
the opinion in Payne v. Taslimi, 2021
U.S. App. LEXIS 15972 (4th Cir., May
27, 2021), is sweeping in scope: “We
limit our decision today to the question
before us: Did Payne have a ‘reasonable
expectation of privacy’ in his HIV
status while in a prison medical unit?
We hold that he did not. When Dr.
Taslimi disclosed his HIV status, Payne
was in prison, a place where individuals
have a curtailed expectation of privacy.
Whatever expectations remain fail to
include the diagnosis of or medication
for HIV, a communicable disease.
The judgment below is therefore
AFFIRMED.”
Circuit Judge Julius N. Richardson
(appointed by President Donald J.
Trump) wrote the opinion. He was
joined by Circuit Judges Stephanie
D. Thacken (appointed by President
Barack Obama) and A. Marvin
Quattlebaum (appointet by Trump).
While the judges reject claims under
the Health Insurance Portability and
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